In February 2014, Russia decided to wrest the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. Moscow could have threatened to attack Ukraine if Kiev failed to relinquish Crimea. However, Russia did not attempt coercion. Russia unilaterally occupied and annexed the territory, gambling that it could take Crimea without provoking war. This alternative strategy -the fait accompli -receives far less scholarly attention. At issue is a fundamental question of statecraft in international politics: How do states make gains? By coercion or by fait accompli? Territorial acquisitions offer the best single-issue domain within which to address this question. Using new data on all 'land grabs' since 1918, this research note documents a stark discrepancy. From 1918 to 2016, 112 land grabs seized territory by fait accompli. In that same span, only 13 publicly-declared coercive threats elicited cessions of territory. This fact suggests that the fait accompli deserves a larger role in the field's thinking about strategy and statecraft on the brink of war. It carries with it important implications for canonical theories of war that rely on assumptions about coercive bargaining during crises.
In February 2014, Russia decided to wrest the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. Moscow could have threatened to attack Ukraine if Kiev failed to relinquish Crimea. Moscow could even have consulted an impressive body of international-relations research on credible threats and coercion for guidance.
1 However, Russia did not attempt coercion. Instead, Russia unilaterally occupied and annexed the territory, gambling that it could take Crimea without provoking war.
This alternative strategy -the fait accompli -receives far less scholarly attention. In the literature's understanding of statecraft on the brink of war, the fait accompli has lived in the shadow of coercion. This longstanding prioritization of coercion emerges from a plausible assumption that scholars typically leave implicit: states ordinarily make gains by coercion, while the fait accompli is a comparative rarity. If so, Crimea was little more than an exception to normal international conduct.
This note upends that assumption. It establishes that states far more often acquire territory by fait accompli than by coercion. At issue is a fundamental question of statecraft in international politics: How do states make gains? Short of prevailing in a war, how does a state acquire something from an adversary that does not wish to surrender it? Territorial gains offer a domain within which to address this question. Using new data on all 'land grabs' since 1918, this 1 (Fearon 1994a; Fearon 1997; Filson and Werner 2002; George and Simons 1994; Jervis 1989; Lebow 1981 ; Leventoglu and Tarar 2008; Martin 1994; Morrow 1999b; Powell 1999; Schelling 1966; Schultz 1998; Slantchev 2011; Snyder and Diesing 1977) .
research note documents a stark discrepancy. From 1918 to 2016, 112 land grabs seized territory by fait accompli, with Crimea the most recent. In that same span, only 13 publicly-declared coercive threats elicited cessions of territory. This fact has direct implications for strategy, statecraft, and scenario planning. It raises questions about canonical theories of war that rely on assumptions about coercive bargaining during crises (see Fearon 1995) .
Although faits accomplis take many forms, territorial acquisitions offer the best singleissue domain within which to examine how frequently each strategy makes gains, for two reasons. First, territory has long ranked as perhaps the foremost issue over which states come into conflict -and the issue most associated with the onset of war (Vasquez and Henehan 2001) .
Second, the outcomes of conflicts-the extent to which each side "won" or "lost"-often prove difficult to measure (see, for instance, Jones et al. 1996, 179) . Change in the military control of territory offers a comparatively clear basis for identifying gains and losses.
The possibility that states most often acquire territory by coercion is no straw man. Quite the opposite, the rarity of territorial gains through coercion should come as a surprise. This research note proceeds as follows. The first section explains the fait accompli as a concept, making that case that it deserves a seat at the table in the field's understanding of strategy and statecraft. With the notable exception of a recent study by Tarar (2016) , which I consider below, the fait accompli has received remarkably little scholarly attention until now.
The second section explores the significance of the fait accompli for widely-held theories of the causes of war. The third details the creation of new data on land grabs from 1918 to 2016.
Existing studies of territorial conflict often remark upon the importance of land grabs, but until now the data to evaluate this phenomenon directly have not existed. 2 The fourth establishes that states far more often made territorial gains by fait accompli than by coercion in the period. The study concludes with a discussion of the questions raised by this finding and points to the need for a new body of research on faits accomplis.
The Fait Accompli
Suppose a criminal armed with a handgun encounters a wealthy man holding his wallet.
The criminal can acquire that wallet in three basic ways. First, the criminal can shoot the victim, then take it. The strategy: brute force. Second, the criminal can brandish the gun, threaten to shoot, and intimidate the man into surrendering his wallet. The strategy: coercion. Or, third, the criminal can reach out and grab the wallet, calculating that the victim will not attack an armed man to regain it. The strategy: fait accompli. States seeking to make gains select from the same three fundamental options, yet the International Relations literature has focused overwhelmingly on just two.
In his foundational study of strategy and statecraft, Schelling (1966, 1-34) established the distinction between brute force and coercion. Through all-out invasion, regime change, or mass killings, challengers can impose a desired outcome without the consent of the defender.
Alternatively, challengers can threaten to inflict harm if their demands go unfulfilled, making gains by coercion when the defender meets those demands. Schelling's distinction, although crucially important, omits and perhaps obscures the fait accompli as a third fundamental way to make gains. 3 This stems from his focus on only the most aggressive forms of brute force.
Although the fait accompli is, like brute force, a unilateral imposition, it takes place on a far smaller and sometimes nonviolent scale. The challenger aims to escape escalation rather than prevail after it. Unlike brute force, a fait accompli does not violently disarm, disable, or destroy the defender.
4
A fait accompli imposes a limited unilateral gain at an adversary's expense in an attempt to get away with that gain when the adversary chooses to relent rather than escalate in retaliation. 5 Each fait accompli is a calculated risk. Whether it results in a successful gain or escalation depends on whether the challenger has successfully gauged the level of loss the defender will accept. Take too much and the defender will prefer war to tolerating the loss. Coercion and the fait accompli are two fundamentally different ways of acquiring something from an adversary. Faits accomplis make gains unilaterally, imposing a change to the status quo without the adversary's consent. Coercive threats, in contrast, pressure the adversary into consenting to a concession, however reluctantly. 7 As the primary strategies for wresting gains from recalcitrant adversaries short of taking them after winning a war, this study focuses on these two alternatives.
More precisely, the fait accompli is an alternative to the specific type of coercion available to challengers: compellence. Compellence is coercion demanding a revision to the status quo; unlike deterrence, which employs threats to preserve the status quo. 8 In his studies of compellence, Sechser (2011; Sechser and Fuhrmann 2013) draws exactly this distinction between coercive gains and gains by fait accompli, referring to them as "compellence" and "compulsion," respectively. Sechser addresses compulsion primarily for methodological reasons.
The problem: cases where the challenger attempted compellence, the defender rebuffed the threat, and the challenger then took what it wanted by force. Without the separate outcome category of compulsion, such cases wrongly register as successes for coercion. 9 Although much of the literature uses the term coercion to encompass both deterrence and compellence, this study follows others who use the term more narrowly to mean compellence (for example, Pape 1996) .
Another appropriate term is ultimatum bargaining.
Surprise is an important characteristic of many -but not all -faits accomplis. 10 With respect to land grabs, partial surprise is typical. Explicit ultimatums demanding territory and 7 I include here both coercion by punishment and coercion by denial (Pape 1996) .
8 Schelling (1966, 35-91) emphasized the greater difficulty of compellence in his original formulation of the deterrence-compellence dichotomy.
9 Also see Pape (1997) Prior to Tarar's article, the most significant discussion of the fait accompli appeared amid studies of the causes of war. These scholars regard the fait accompli is a risky crisis tactic, one that exacerbates the likelihood of war (Snyder and Diesing 1977, 227; Van Evera 1998, 10) . Van Evera, for instance, characterizes the fait accompli as a "halfway step to war." In their study of deterrence, George and Smoke (1974, 536-40) identify faits accomplis as an intermediate form of deterrence failure. From that perspective, faits accomplis are worse for the deterrer than maintaining the status quo but better than an unlimited attack. Mearsheimer (1983, 53-58) encompasses faits accomplis within the military strategy of "limited aims." Unlike the alternative strategies of blitzkrieg and attrition, a limited aims attack consists of a sudden operation to seize a border region while engaging only a small fraction of the enemy's forces. Mearsheimer regards this strategy with skepticism, arguing that even a limited aims attack will make a "lengthy war of attrition … very likely because the defender's key decision makers will undoubtedly be under great pressure to recapture lost territory." However, most land grabs do not start wars. Fewer still provoke high-intensity wars of attrition. Military strategy does not offer the best lens for understanding land grabs. The fait accompli is first and foremost a political strategy, one that aspires not to require a military strategy.
Although providing an important starting point for thinking about faits accomplis, the literature lacks a clear sense of how prevalent they are in international politics. One might read this literature in full and come away with the impression that the fait accompli is a niche phenomenon seen in a handful of cases, not something of importance for general theories of International Relations.
The Significance of the Fait Accompli for the Bargaining Model of War
If, as this note will show, states far more often make territorial gains by fait accompli than by coercion, what does it mean for existing theories of International Relations? This section examines the implications for the foremost research question in the field: the causes of war. In particular, the surprising rarity of coerced territorial gains raises questions about the bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995) . Assumptions about coercive bargaining in crises anchor this widely-held rationalist theory of war.
Consequently, understanding the true process of strategic interaction in crises is a first-order issue for
International Relations theory. I begin by refuting a prima facie plausible line of reasoning that regards the rarity of coerced territorial cessions as an outright falsification of the bargaining model.
Nonetheless, I then explain why the predominance of gains by fait accompli may lead to important changes to theories built around the bargaining model.
At first glance, the greater prevalence of faits accomplis relative to coerced concessions seems to destabilize established bargaining theories of war. According to Reiter (2003, 31) , "The bargaining model proposes that exercising brute force to accomplish limited aims is generally misguided." Since Fearon's seminal article, the field has increasingly come to conceive of war as the result of a failure to reach a war-averting coercive bargain. Peace endures when threats of war lead one side to give up enough so that the other no longer prefers a costly war to a peaceful bargain (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000) . Therefore, the rarity of coerced bargains in the issue area most associated with the onset of war -territory -seems to pose a severe problem. How can coercive bargaining preserve the peace if there are so few coerced bargains? Indeed, territory commonly provides the explicit if stylized stakes for these models (for example , Fearon 1995; Filson and Werner 2002, 825; Powell 2004; Powell 2006 ).
However, the rarity of coerced cessions does not in itself falsify the bargaining model.
Each fait accompli can function as a tacit bargain. The required war-avoiding concession takes the form of a decision not to escalate in response to a fait accompli. 13 Although not an invalidation of the framework, this changes the nature of the envisioned bargaining process. That process no longer requires negotiation, coercive threats, or verbal bargaining of any kind. This may falsify narrower interpretations of the bargaining model. Stripped of these elements, however, the underlying premise remains intact. The two sides avoid war when both find agreeing to the new status quo preferable to war. . This is not an abstract concern. Signaling is the concept most often applied to interpret state behavior during crises. According to Fearon (1994b) , "States resort to the risky and provocative actions that characterize crises (i.e., mobilization and deployment of troops and public warnings or threats about the use of force) because less-public diplomacy may not allow them to credibly reveal their own preferences."
However, signals of resolve do not seem to contribute to intimidating states into granting territorial concessions with any regularity. States practicing coercion must convey their resolve effectively to receive a concession. In contrast, states can take a gain by fait accompli without preparatory signaling.
13 Intriguingly, and unlike most of the subsequent literature, Fearon (1995, 394, 405 ) models waravoiding bargains using the term "fait accompli" (exactly twice). However, he uses the term to refer to making take-it-or-leave-it offers, which encompass both faits accomplis (by my definition) and coercive ultimatums. Therefore, he does not fully explore the distinction between coercion and the fait accompli.
14 Tarar (2016) formally integrates faits accomplis into the rationalist framework. Fey and Ramsay (2010) show that the framework is not especially dependent on assumptions about the exact bargaining protocol.
The full connection between signaling and the prevalence of faits accomplis is perhaps surprising. It emerges only through a consideration of the likely reasons why territorial gains by fait accompli are so much more common than gains by coercion. To my knowledge, the following four are the only unitary rationalist explanations for the greater prevalence of land grabs relative to coerced territorial cessions. 15 That is, these explanations accord with the simplifying assumption that states are singular actors that rationally pursue their interests (Fearon 1995 Finally, suppose that losing territory to a land grab is not significantly costlier than losing it to a coercive threat as a concession. If so, defenders may opt to make challengers prove that they are in fact willing to risk war to take the territory. By rejecting the challenger's threat, the defender preserves the possibility of retaining the territory if the challenger is bluffing.
Defenders may prefer a slim chance of keeping the territory if the challenger is bluffing to the certainty of losing it by capitulating. In the Crimean context, this explanation posits that Ukraine would have preferred the possibility of retaining Crimea by rejecting Russian demands to the certainty of losing Crimea after agreeing to cede it. Anticipating this, Russia issued no threats and chose instead to impose a fait accompli.
In sum, it is surprisingly difficult to reconcile the rarity of territorial gains by coercion with the prevailing conceptualization of state behavior during crises: signals of resolve designed to endow coercive threats with credibility. This matters because assumptions about the nature of strategic interactions on the brink of war lay the foundations for larger theories of international 17 My thanks to James Fearon for suggesting this explanation.
politics. For instance, popular theories explaining both the democratic peace and the peacepromoting effect of bilateral trade rely on crucial assumptions about the importance of signals of resolve (Schultz 1998; Morrow 1999a; Gartzke et al. 2001) . A reduced role for signaling during crises may call into question bedrock theories of International Relations. Replacing coercive threats with faits accomplis has implications that extend far beyond the subjects of crisis statecraft and territorial conflict.
Data and Measurement
In territorial conflicts, the fait accompli takes the form of the land grab. Coercion makes territorial gains in the form of cessions under threat. This section summarizes the definitions and measurement of each. It details the creation of new data on land grabs.
A land grab is a military deployment that seizes a disputed piece of territory with the intention to assume lasting control. Each state can commit a maximum of one land grab in one militarized dispute or crisis. I do not distinguish, for instance, between seizing one island and seizing a group of islands if these seizures occur within the same militarized dispute. This definition of land grab excludes most cross-border military operations because they lack an intention to assume control of additional territory (that is, to change the border). 19 Incursions other than land grabs include interventions in civil wars, raids on rebel bases, peacekeeping missions, and navigational errors by military patrols.
Land grabs are a form of behavior, not an outcome. To qualify as a land grab, the challenger must occupy disputed territory that it did not previously hold. There is no minimum time for which the challenger must retain the territory. The eventual outcome -whether the challenger keeps lasting control of the territory -does not factor into the definition. Nonetheless, Mearsheimer's (1983) limited aims strategy applies better to these cases than to land grabs generally.
21 (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Diehl and Goertz 2002; Jones et al. 1996; Sarkees et al. 2010; Tir et al. 1998 ). I would like to thank Ken Schultz for providing case narratives on territorial MIDs. I also made more limited use of the ICOW Territorial Claims and Territorial Dispute datasets (Hensel et al. 2008; Huth and Allee 2002; Huth 1996) . 22 Although the ICOW dataset includes "military conquest/occupation" as a mode of resolution of territorial claims, this category contains few land grabs (Hensel et al. 2008) . Land grabs rarely result in MID dataset includes the "highest action" (in terms of escalation) taken by each actor during a dispute. Although the 14 th level of this variable is "occupation of territory," cases only enter this category when no higher escalation occurs. Any case that escalates to, for instance, "attack" (level 17), "clash" (level 18) or war (levels 20 and 21) does not qualify as an occupation of territory. This leaves out many land grabs. 23 Moreover, most occupations of territory are not land grabs, but rather cross-border incursions for other purposes. Similarly, the Territorial Change dataset includes land grabs in three of its seven categories: "conquest," "annexation," and (more rarely) "cession." Each category contains many events other than land grabs, including coerced cessions and legal settlements. the immediate termination of territorial claims. Consequently, brute force conquests of entire states account for many of these claims resolutions.
23 Zacher (2001) provides a list of "interstate territorial aggressions," but it leaves out many land grabs because it selects on violence.
24 Both codebooks and datasets are available from the Correlates of War webpage. Also see Diehl and Goertz (2002, 53-54 
How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries
The data reveal that states far more often acquire territory by fait accompli than by 26 I found that challengers either try to get away with a limited gain -seeking to acquire only small pieces of a defender's territory -or accept that the defender will resist fully and aim for the full territory.
Attempts to acquire, for instance, half of another state's territory are exceedingly rare. If the stakes are high enough that the defender will resist fully, there is little reason to limit war aims. This supports my conception of land grabs as faits accomplis and conquests of entire states as brute force.
Figure 1: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries, 1918-2016
States make territorial gains by coercion with surprising rarity. Not once in the last fifty years has a publicly-declared threat coerced a state into ceding territory without the coercer deploying its military to seize the territory first. Only two coerced territorial cessions took place These cases each contain two land grabs. All but a few of the retaliatory land grabs retook the seized territory.
27 Decolonization conflicts between imperial powers and groups representing occupied populations fall outside the scope of this study because they are not conflicts between two existing states. Many of these groups seem to have succeeded at coercing out the colonizing power. This raises questions of whether and why coercion was more successful in these conflicts. There are a variety of ways to parse the exact ratio of land grabs to coerced cessions.
Some reduce the disparity; others strengthen it. For instance, excluding acquisitions of entire states eliminates twenty-one conquests by (brute) force, but only four cessions. 31 Conversely, including retaliatory land grabs inflates the number of land grabs. Nonetheless, this inclusion is appropriate. When a challenger takes a piece of a territory, the defender can seek to regain that territory by fait accompli or by coercion. Indeed, many victims of land grabs immediately demand withdrawal and back those demands with threats of force. These threats failed, except in the cases of Gamma Island (discussed above) and the Amur River Islands in 1937. Japanese threats succeeded at undoing that Soviet land grab. The absence of additional cases of coercion reversing land grabs offers relevant evidence that speaks to the rarity of coercive gains.
30 Fazal (2011, 53) notes this possibility.
31 These capitulations -Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -also cluster around the onset of the Second World War.
Moreover, one might exclude retaliatory land grabs on the grounds that they are not fully independent observations. However, this same concern would justify removing a minimum of four of the remaining eleven coerced cessions. The disparity would remain.
The 112 to 13 figure rests on defining land grabs and coerced cessions as forms of territorial acquisition, that is, as events that occur at single moments in time irrespective of what follows. It is, nonetheless, reasonable to ask what happens next. Of particular concern, this comparison excludes failed coercive threats but includes land grabs that succeeded at taking territory only to fail to retain control for long.
Wars and retaliatory land grabs provide the two leading reasons for the failure of land grabs to secure lasting gains. Table 3 show that both strategies often failed to secure lasting gains. Land grabs and coerced cessions alike produce gains that remain after ten years only about half of the time. That success rate drops further for each when including only cases of uninterrupted control of the territory for ten years. This provides a better barometer of whether the land grab or coercive threat created the gain, rather than merely happening to precede it. The ten-year comparisons warrant some caution. Because so many cessions occurred during the pre-WWII cluster, the war may have deflated the long-term success rate of coercion.
The two strategies clearly differ in one respect: land grabs failed more quickly. By the end of the militarized dispute in which the land grab occurred, including any resultant crisis or war, defenders reversed half of the land grabs. Although a large reduction, note that even this revised ratio is approximately 1 to 4.5 in favor of the fait accompli. This figure would still represent a striking departure from conventional assumptions that coercion is of central importance for international politics while the fait accompli merits only occasional attention.
Territory changes hands in more ways than just coercion and the fait accompli. The two are the primary adversarial means by which states acquire territory at each other's expense short of war. They are the two ways to make gains in the thick of crises. Nonetheless, territory also changes hands at the ends of wars and -quite frequently -through negotiated agreements. Could these negotiated agreements be coercion?
To address this question, I examined all territorial cessions since 1918 irrespective of whether the cases appear as conflicts (compellent threats, crises, disputes, or wars) in the associated datasets. 33 I observed that negotiated agreements to cede territory tend to occur years 33 On the cessions data, see Diehl and Goertz (2002 There are many ways to compare coercion to faits accomplis. Some produce a ratio less uneven than 112 to 13, but the bottom line remains unchanged. Although the International
Relations literature devotes far more attention to coercion, the fait accompli better accords with the modern history of territorial gains.
Questions Raised
The fait accompli deserves to emerge from the shadow of coercion and take on a major role in thinking about statecraft on the brink of war. In providing evidence to support that conclusion, this research note aims to provide an impetus to future research about the fait accompli. To aid in that endeavor, I conclude with a set of unanswered questions.
First, what does it mean for bargaining theories of war that, at least with respect to territory, explicit coercive bargains are so rare, while faits accomplis are more prevalent? How For scholars, theoretical models of crises and the onset of war can better represent reality by explicitly integrating faits accomplis. For statesmen contemplating potential crises, it is vital to identify and prepare for potential adversary faits accomplis, both to deter them and to respond effectively if deterrence fails. When the issue is disputed territory, challengers have not struggled to identify the land grab as a strategic option. Nonetheless, the current foreign policy discourse has yet to recognize the land grab as one of the most probable and consequential threats facing the world today. It is time for the fait accompli to receive the attention it deserves as one of the principal tools of statecraft in international politics, on par with coercion.
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34 These are the first two scenarios for Biddle and Oelrich (2016, 15-16 
